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Hampton: The Need for a New Slayer Statute in North Carolina

THE NEED FOR A NEW SLAYER STATUTE
CAROLINA*
I.

IN NORTH

INTRODUCTION

A forty-year-old woman drove her elderly mother to the doctor as
she did every week. They were running behind schedule when the
daughter briefly stopped at an intersection and looked for oncoming
traffic. As the daughter pushed through the intersection, a truck
struck her car on the passenger side. As a result of the accident, the
woman's elderly mother died. Assuming her actions were negligent,
should the daughter's failure to see the truck preclude her from inheriting from her mother as a natural object of her bounty?
The common sense answer is no. The daughter did not intentionally kill her mother. In fact, the daughter is fortunate that her negligence did not kill her. The mother probably would not wish to
disinherit the daughter in light of the circumstances. In North Carolina, the1 daughter could be disqualified from inheriting-not as a
"slayer," but rather as one that should not profit from her own
wrong.2 North Carolina courts have circumvented the slayer statute3
and wrongly interpreted the common law on this subject, which has
led to such unintended consequences.
A.

Outline of North Carolina Slayer Statute- Chapter 31A

The North Carolina slayer statute is codified as Chapter 31A of
the General Statutes of North Carolina. The statute is relatively comprehensive, considering some states do not have any codified provi4
sion for the forfeiture of property by slayers.
Section 31A-3 marks the start of the slayer rule, setting out important definitions of "decedent," "property," and "slayer." "Slayer" means
any person who by a court of competent jurisdiction shall have been
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor James B. McLaughlin,
Jr. for his helpful insight in regard to the issues discussed in this comment.
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(3) (1999). "'Slayer' means any person who by a court
of competent jurisdiction shall have been convicted as a principal or accessory before
the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of another person."
2. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 49, 213 S.E.2d 563, 565
(1975).
3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A (1999).
4. Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, app. A at 399-400 (Md. 1986). This appendix
provides a list of states with slayer statutes.
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convicted, entered a plea of guilty, or tendered a plea of nolo contendre
upon indictment, as a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of another person.5 In addition,
[a] slayer can also be one that has been found in a civil action or proceeding brought within one year after the death of the decedent to have
willfully and unlawfully killed the decedent or procured his killing,
and who shall have died or committed suicide before having been tried
for the offense and before the settlement of the estate.6
Section 4 outlines the alternative distribution of the decedent's
estate due to the slayer's forfeiture. 7 The slayer will be deemed to have
died just prior to the death of the decedent. Therefore, the slayer cannot acquire any benefit from the decedent, whether it is by testate or
intestate succession, common law, or statutory right.' However, the
slayer's living issue are entitled to the interest if the decedent dies intestate, and the property shall be distributed per stirpes.9 If there are no
such living issue, the property passes as if the slayer predeceased the
decedent.' ° If the decedent dies testate, the property which would
pass to the slayer pursuant to a will shall be devised in accordance with
the lapse statute under the presumption that the slayer predeceased
the decedent."
Sections 5 and 6 explain the consequences to the slayer's rights
regarding joint property held by the slayer and decedent as tenants by
the entirety' 2 and joint tenants with right of survivorship, respectively.' 3 Both sections provide that the portion of the property possessed by the slayer will continue to be held by the slayer for his
lifetime. 14 The decedent's property share will pass to his estate upon
his death.' 5 When the slayer dies, his or her property will pass to the
estate of the decedent.
5. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(a-c) (1999).
6. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(d) (1999). There is an inherent mistake in this statute
because it requires death or suicide of the killer to accompany the civil action in order
for the killer to be deemed a slayer. This problem was, in effect, corrected by the court
in Jones v. All American Life Ins. Co., 312 N.C. 725, 325 S.E.2d 237 (1985). See also
infra notes 150, 151 and accompanying text.
7. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-4 (1999).
8. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-4(1) (1999).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

§ 31A-4(2).
§ 31A-4(2).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-4(3) (1999).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-5 (1999).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-6 (1999).
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 31A-5 and 31A-6 (1999).
§§ 31A-5 and 31A-6
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Sections 7 and 8 determine the result of future interests held by
the slayer that were subject to the death of the decedent. Section 7
states that where a vested future interest of the slayer, that was subject
to the intervening life estate of the decedent or a third party whose
interest is measured by the life of the decedent, the property will pass
to the decedent's estate or be kept by a third party for the life expectancy of the decedent. 6 Section 8 covers contingent remainders and
executory interests of the slayer. If the interest would vest or increase
upon the death of the decedent, the interest shall not vest or increase
during the period of the life expectancy of the decedent. 1 7 If the interest would not have become vested or increased had the slayer predeceased the decedent, then the slayer shall be deemed to have
predeceased the decedent.' 8
According to Section 9, when the slayer holds an interest in property subject to divestment by the decedent (should decedent survive
him or live to a certain age), the interest shall remain in possession of
the slayer during his lifetime or until the decedent would have reached
such age, but then passes as though the decedent died immediately
after the slayer or the reaching of that age.' 9
Any power of appointment in favor of the slayer by the decedent's
will shall pass in accordance with the lapse statute as if the slayer predeceased the decedent.2 ° Section 10 also states that present or future
interests held by the slayer, but subject to divestment by the exercise of
a general power of appointment, shall pass to the estate of the decedent. 2 ' Furthermore, any interest subject to the slayer's exercise of a
special power of appointment will pass to such person(s) in equal
shares, exclusive of the slayer.2 2
Section 11 extends the slayer's forfeiture to insurance benefits.

23

When the insured dies, the slayer cannot inherit insurance proceeds
payable to him. Instead, these proceeds pass as if the slayer predeceased the decedent.2 4 If the slayer's insurance policy designates the
decedent as a beneficiary or assignee, the proceeds of such a policy are
to be paid to the estate of the decedent on the death of the slayer.2 5
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

N.C. Gen. Stat.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 31A-10(b).
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 31A-11.
§ 31A-11.

§ 31A-7 (1999).
§ 31A-8(2) (1999).
§ 31A-8(1) (1999).
§ 31A-9 (1999).
§ 31A-10(a) (1999).
§ 31A-10(b) (1999).
§ 31A-11 (1999).
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Section 12 protects persons acquiring property or interests of the
slayer affected by this chapter 26 only if they did not have any notice of
the circumstances that brought their interests within the scope of this
chapter.2 7 All consideration received by the slayer will be held in trust
for those entitled to the interests under this chapter, and it is the
responsibility of the slayer to make up the difference.2 8
Section 13 allows the record of the judicial proceeding determining the slayer status to be admissible in evidence for or against a claimant of property in a civil action arising under this chapter. 9 Also, the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is not applicable to cases governed
under this chapter, according to Section 14.30
Section 15 declares that the slayer chapter should be construed in
a way that will effect the policy of the state that no person shall be
allowed to profit by his own wrong.3 1 The final Section further provides that as to acts specifically provided for in this chapter, the rules
of this chapter are to supply the only rules, remedies, and procedures. 2 For acts not specifically within the slayer chapter, all existing
or future remedies, rules, and procedures shall be applicable.3 3
B.

History of Chapter 31A

North Carolina adopted the current slayer statute in 1961. 34 The
drafting committee enacted a statutory scheme developed by Professor
John Wade of Harvard Law School.3 5 Wade published his all-inclusive
slayer statute in an attempt to avoid the wide array of disparate decisions coming from states without such a statute.3 6
The Wade model supplied definitions for key terms like slayer,
provided for the proper distribution in cases where a slayer was present, and allotted for a reversion to common law principles where the
26. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-12 (1999).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

§ 31A-12.
§ 31A-12.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-13 (1999).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-14 (1999).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-15 (1999).

32. § 31A-15.

33. § 31A-15.
34. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A (1999). The distribution provisions in Section 4 were
amended and became effective October 1, 1999.
35. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 51, 213 S.E.2d 563, 566
(1975).
36. John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another- A Statutory
Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 716 (1936).
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statute did not cover such situations.3 7 It defined "the term 'slayer' [to]
mean any person who willfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be
taken the life of another," and added that this definition should not
include the crime of involuntary manslaughter because of the lack of
intent.38
Wade's model allotted for a reversion to common law principles
where the specific provisions did not cover a situation by including
Section 15 of the statute. 39 Section 15 states the "[a]ct shall not be
considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to
effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to profit
by his own wrong. '"40
Desire for a thorough statute prompted Professor Wade to add
Section 15. He acknowledged that this section is there to reinforce the
notion that the statute is not penal in nature and should not be subject
to strict construction. 4 1 Also, he wanted to allow for judicial determinations where the slayer could benefit from the decedent's death in
circumstances occurring outside the ambit of the specific sections.4 2
Indeed, Section 15 opened the door for judicial determinations not
within the statute, which extended further than "slayers" per se.4 3
When North Carolina adopted Wade's proposal in 1961, the Special Drafting Committee commented on the proposed section, but elaborated on Wade's comments by declaring the section to preserve the
common law as to all acts not specifically provided for in Chapter
31A.44
37. Id. at 715.
38. Id. at 721-22 n.30. Professor Wade stated that cases were in accord as to the
effect of "willful and unlawful"(citing Lundy v. Lundy, 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 650, 652
(1895), Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hand, 102 S.E. 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1920), Holdom
v. A.O.U.W., 43 N.E. 772 (Ill.
1896)), "in that it will not prevent inheritance of
property in cases of justifiable or excusable homicide, of accidental killing, or where
the slayer was insane." Id.
39. Wade, supra note 36, at 750-51. This also corresponds to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 31A-15 (1999).
40. Id. at 750.
41. Id. at 751.
42. Id.
43. Id. Wade provides this section to allow states to go outside the statute if a
situation arises in which the "slayer" would be allowed to profit from his own wrong.
In interpreting this, North Carolina courts disregarded what it took to be classified as a
slayer. To be a "slayer" as defined in Wade's article and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3, one
willfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of another.
44. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 55, 213 S.E.2d 563, 568
(1975) (quoting Special Report of the General Statutes Commission on An Act to be
Entitled 'Acts Barring Property Rights' (1961)).
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Thus the fact that this Chapter covers only certain acts of wrongful killing does not necessarily preclude other wrongful acts from barring property rights by common law, such as involuntary
manslaughter or an acquitted killer in some cases. In such instances
the constructive trust concept and other nonstatutory remedies remain
available under the terms of this Chapter.4 5
By this language, the Special Drafting Committee presumed the
common law would not allow for inheritance in the case of involuntary manslaughter. The question as to the intended effect of this language is whether it was meant to impose their view of the common
law, or merely allow for judicial determination in cases not covered by
the other provisions.
In any case, it is this legislative history, combined with recent
court decisions that left North Carolina with an incorrect determination of the common law and unjust results in regard to slayers. "Few, if
any, other jurisdictions have gone so far as North Carolina in such
[holdings]., 4 6

II.
A.

THE COMMON LAW

As

DETERMINED BY NORTH CAROLINA COURTS

The Beginning: Quick v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company

In 1975, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in the case of
Quick v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company4 7 that a woman convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of her husband could not
receive insurance proceeds as the named beneficiary under his life
insurance policy. Quick accidentally shot and killed her husband.4
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the common law maxim
that "no one should be allowed to profit from his own wrong."
The trial court in Quick found that the wife, Jill Quick, was a
slayer under the meaning of the statute, because involuntary manslaughter was a willful and unlawful killing of another person as set
out in N.C. Gen. Stat. §31A-3(3)(a). Furthermore, her act was against
45. Id. (quoting Special Report of the General Statutes Commission on An Act to
be Entitled 'Acts Barring Property Rights' (1961)).

46. J. David Walsh, Note, Decedent's Estates- Forfeitures of Property Rights by
Slayers, 12 Wake Forest L. Rev. 448, 455 (1976) (citing 5 A. Scott, Trusts 3504 (3d ed.
1967)) ("It seems clear that in the absence of a statute otherwise providing, the fact
that the legatee or heir was guilty of involuntary manslaughter is not sufficient ground
to preclude him from taking and keeping the property which he inherits from the

decedent.").
47. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
48. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 N.C. App. 504, 209 S.E.2d 323 (1974),
rev'd and remanded, 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
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North Carolina's public policy that "no person should be allowed to
profit from his or her own wrong." 4 9 Finding involuntary manslaughter not to be a willful and unlawful killing within the meaning of the
statute, the court of appeals reversed.5 0 According to the interpretation by the court of appeals, Quick was not a slayer.5 1 It also declared
that "the General Assembly has elected to legislate in the subject matter of this controversy and that the policy so established supplants the
'5 2
common law rule which would not have allowed her to recover.
The North Carolina Supreme Court also determined Quick was
not a slayer under the statute.5 3 To be a slayer within the meaning of
54
the slayer statute, the killing must have been willful and unlawful.
The term "willful" can mean the "wrongful doing of an act without
justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and
deliberately in violation of law."'5 5 Here, according to the supreme
court, willful killing refers to "intentional homicide. 5 6 Involuntary
manslaughter is defined as "an unlawful killing, without malice, without premeditation and deliberation, and without intention to kill or
inflict serious bodily injury."5 7 Thus, it satisfies the definition of
unintentional homicide and is outside the scope of the slayer rule.5 8
In addition to the slayer definitions of Chapter 31A, the question
remained whether the provisions of Chapter 31A completely supplanted the common law principle recognized by the court that "one
should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong."5 9 To determine
this question, the supreme court turned to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-15,
which allows for a broad construction to effect the State's policy that
no person should be allowed to profit by his own wrong. 60 The
49. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 49, 213 S.E.2d 563, 565
(1975) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-15 (1999)).
50. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 N.C. App. 504, 507, 209 S.E.2d 323,

325 (1975).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 51, 213 S.E.2d 563, 566
(1975).
54. Id. at 51, 213 S.E.2d at 566.
55. Id. at 51, 213 S.E.2d at 565.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 53, 213 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 682, 185
S.E.2d 129, 132 (1971)).
58. Id. See State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969); State v. Griffin,
273 N.C. 333, 159 S.E.2d 889 (1968); State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E.2d 889
(1963).
59. Quick, 287 N.C. at 54, 213 S.E.2d at 568.
60. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-15 (1999).
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supreme court also relied on the comments to the proposed section in
the legislative history which indicated that "[tlhis section preserves the
common law, substantive and 6procedural,
as to all acts not specifically
1
provided for in this Chapter."

Interestingly, the court also cited Professor Wade's comment to
Section 15 of the Model Act in support of its conclusion, which stated
that "[i]t is always possible, of course, that some situation may arise
which is not expressly covered in Sections 3 to 11. "162 But Wade concluded that
"the slayer will still be prevented from acquiring [any]
63
benefit.

The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's
judgment that the evidence "was sufficient to support its conclusion of
law.., to the effect that under the common law of this state defendant
Jill A. Quick was disqualified from receiving any insurance proceeds
from the policy insuring her deceased husband's life."' 64 The trial
court could disqualify Quick since the killing, while unintentional,
"resulted from her culpable negligence, that is conduct incompatible
with a proper regard for human life. Culpable negligence proximately
resulting in death comes within the purview of the common law
maxim that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong. "65
B.

Other Cases Are Quick to Follow Quick

Following Quick, the court in Lofton v. Lofton resorted to the common law to disqualify a boy's inheritance from his parents after his
conviction for involuntary manslaughter for killing them.66 Unlike the
Quick court, the court here did not misinterpret the common law,
because the boy was convicted of only involuntary manslaughter, but
also admitted to willfully shooting his parents.67
Smith v. Independent Life Insurance Company concerned an estate

settlement dispute when both decedents had life insurance policies
naming the other as beneficiary, and were both killed in the same car
61. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 55, 213 S.E.2d 563, 568
(1975) (quoting Special Report of the General Statutes Commission on An Act to be
Entitled 'Acts Barring Property Rights' (1961)).
62. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 56, 213 S.E.2d 563, 568
(1975) (quoting John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another- A
Statutory Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1936)).
63. Wade, supra note 36, at 751.
64. Quick v United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 59, 213 S.E.2d 563, 570

(1975).
65. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570-71.

66. Lofton v. Lofton, 26 N.C. App. 203, 215 S.E.2d 861 (1975).
67. Id. at 210, 215 S.E.2d at 866.
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accident.6 8 The issue on appeal was whether the insurance company
had to pay the estate of the beneficiary who was driving the car, and
was thus responsible for the accident and death of the insured.6 9 Both
sides in this case argued the Quick case. 70 The plaintiff alleged that the
driver, William, was culpably negligent, and that this was sufficient
under the common law to bar him from receiving the insurance proceeds. 7 The court did not find sufficient evidence, and held that the
plaintiffs had not shown culpable negligence by the driver.7 2 No
North Carolina case law involving culpable negligence has found such
73
negligence "in the absence of either willful or wanton conduct."
The logic flowing from the Smith opinion strongly supports the
contention that the slayer statute should not bar unintentional acts. By
equating willful or wanton conduct with culpable negligence, the Smith
court put culpable negligence within the purview of the slayer statute.
A finding of willful or wanton conduct would, in effect, take cases out
of the category of involuntary manslaughter because it is, by definition, unintentional and not willful.
Lynch v. Newsom upheld the Quick case.7 4 In Lynch, the plaintiff
was the father of two boys allegedly killed by their mother, or as a
consequence of her actions. 75 The plaintiff also alleged that the
mother took part in procuring the deaths of her parents and grandmother while she was the primary beneficiary. 76 The defendants in
the Lynch case argued that since the plaintiff brought no action under
the slayer statute within a year to declare the mother a slayer, the plaintiff should be barred from proving that the mother's wrongdoing contributed to the two boys' deaths.7 7 The court held for the plaintiff and
relied on Quick:
This enactment [of the slayer statute] merely authorizes an additional
means of preventing some wrongdoers from profiting from their
wrongs; it authorizes an action, if brought within the year, to establish
by simplified proof the ineligibility of a slayer to share in the property
68. Smith v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 269, 258 S.E.2d 864 (1979).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 276, 258 S.E.2d at 868.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 277, 258 S.E.2d at 869.
73. Smith v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 269, 277, 258 S.E.2d 864,
868-69 (1979). See Ingle v. Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
74. Lynch v. Newsom, 96 N.C. App. 53, 57, 384 S.E.2d 284, 287, rev. denied, 326
N.C. 48, 389 S.E.2d 90 (1989).
75. Id. at 54, 384 S.E.2d at 285.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 57, 384 S.E.2d at 284, 287.
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of his victim; ... it did not abrogate any of the many procedures
devised by the common law to prevent one from profiting from his
own wrong; a litigant's failure to file an action under the slayer statute
within a year of the death involved only bars him from filing such an
action and availing himself of the presumptions and evidentiary shortcuts authorized by that statute; it does not affect his common law right
to prove in any appropriate action, if he can,78 that the alleged wrongdoer's culpable negligence caused the death.
As recently as 1997, the Quick rule was acknowledged in State
Farm Life Insurance Company v. Allison.7 9 The Allison court stated that
in North Carolina a person can be barred from collecting life insurance proceeds either by being deemed a slayer under the slayer statute,
or by coming within the bounds of the common law rule that no one
may profit from his own wrongdoing.8 0
III.

A.

WHAT IS THE COMMON LAW AS TO SLAYERS?

History of Cases Developing Slayer Rules

In his proposed statutory solution, Professor Wade outlined three
historical views of the forfeiture of property rights by slayers.,
The first view, that complete ownership will pass to the slayer in
spite of his or her wrong, was the holding in the North Carolina case of
Owens v. Owens.82 Owens and subsequent cases reasoned that the
courts could not override or change the statutory scheme developed
for inheritance.8 3
Another view allowed no property to pass to the slayer as a result
of the slayer's killing.8 4 In the case of Riggs v. Palmer, the court
decided that a grandson could not inherit from his grandfather where
he had murdered his grandfather in order to inherit from him.8 5 The
78. Id. at 54-58, 384 S.E.2d at 287.
79. State Farm Life Ins. Co v. Allison, 128 N.C. App. 74, 76, 493 S.E.2d 329, 330

(1997).
80. Id.
81. Wade, supra note 36, at 715.
82. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
83. Wade, supra note 36, at 717.
84. Id. at 717 n.12 (citing Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470 (Md. 1933); Slocum v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816 (Mass. 1923); Garwols v. Bankers Trust Co.,
232 N.W. 239 (Mich. 1930); Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641 (Mo. 1908); Riggs v.
Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)). The English and colonial authorities have adopted
this view. See Estate of Crippen [1923] P. 108 (will); In the Estate of Hall [19141 P.I.
(C.A.) (will); In Re Sigsworth [1935] I Ch. 89; Lundy v. Lundy, 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 650

(1895) (will).
85. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
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Riggs court recognized that the rules and statutes concerning wills and
devolution of property would give the property to the murdering
grandson, if liberally construed. 6 The Riggs court continued on this
point:
[aill laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their own operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law.
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advanupon his own iniquity, or
tage of his own wrong, or to found any 8claim
7
to acquire property by his own crime.
A third view that received little support by cases at its inception
was that "title [would] pass to the slayer, but that equity [would] hold
him a constructive trustee for the heirs or next of kin of the decedent.""" This view created problems, in that a constructive trust can be
imposed only in favor of one who has been unjustly deprived of property. 8 9 Thus, other heirs could not contend deprivation of property by
the slayer's act because they would not have taken it anyway. 90 However, it could be reasoned that if the decedent survived the slayer, then
the property passing to the slayer would have passed to them. 9 1
Another logistical difficulty in this third view was the belief that a constructive trust could only be imposed when the slayer killed the decedent for the purpose of inheriting property. 92
Some states enacted statutes in an attempt to deal more effectively
with inheritance rights of slayers. Other states continued to rely on
common law interpretation. Maryland is an example of one such
state, as can be seen in the Ford case.9 3
B.

Recent Analysis of Common Law- Ford v. Ford

In the recent Maryland case of Ford v. Ford, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland faced the issue of whether a woman who murdered her
mother, yet was found insane, could be allowed to inherit from her
mother. 9 4 The court grappled with the issue of what quantum of
intent should be required on the part of the slayer to preclude
inheritance.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 190.
Wade, supra note 36, at 718-19.
Id. at 719 n.14.

90. Id.

91. Id.
92. Id.

93. Ford v. Ford, 512 A2d 389 (Md. 1986).
94. Id.
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The court previously dealt with the issue of the intent necessary to
implement the slayer's rule in the case of Schifanelli v. Wallace.91 In
Schifanelli, a man had unintentionally killed his wife as a result of his
gross negligence.9 6 The court held that "the overwhelming weight of
authority allows recovery where the beneficiary causes the death of the
insured unintentionally or not feloniously."9 7 Furthermore, the court
stated the basic rule that where the death was the result of carelessness, and thus not intentional, the rights of the beneficiary are not
barred. 98 The Schifanelli court allowed recovery for the husband on
the policy since the accident was the result of the husband's gross negligence and there had been an express finding of unintentional
cause.

99

The Ford court relied on Schifanelli and established the slayer's
rule of Maryland:
1) A person who kills another
a) may not share in the distribution of the decedent's estate as an
heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or
legatee under the decedent's will, nor may he collect the proceeds as a
beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life when the
homicide is felonious and intentional;
b) may share in the distribution of the decedent's estate as an heir
by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the decedent's will and may collect the proceeds as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life when the
homicide is unintentional even though it is the result of such gross
negligence as would render the killer criminally guilty of involuntary
manslaughter[. 1100

The Ford court founded its rule on the same common law principle cited in North Carolina cases, even though the Maryland rule is
opposite of the North Carolina rule.1 ' Again, that principle is the
equitable maxim that no one should be able to profit by his own fraud
or take advantage of his own wrong.'1 2 However, North Carolina interpreted the maxim to mean that a wrong could be a consequence of
95. Schifanelli v. Wallace, 315 A.2d 513 (Md. 1974).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 519.
98. Id. (relying on Tippens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.
1938); Commercial Travelers Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966)).
99. Id.
100. Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 392 (Md. 1986) (emphasis added).
101. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 54, 213 S.E.2d 563, 568
(1975).
102. Ford, 512 A.2d at 390.
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one's "culpable negligence." 103 Culpable negligence is merely "conduct incompatible with a proper regard for human life."'1 4 This definition could include anything from running a red light to speeding, but
the Maryland
neither act would be sufficient for disinheritance 0under
5
proven.1
be
could
kill
to
intent
actual
rule, unless
C. The History of the Maxim- Nullus commodum capere potest de
injurid sud propri' 0 6
The well known equitable maxim, nullus commodum capere potest

de injurid sud proprid, has been cited as the guiding common law principle for property right forfeiture by slayers.' 0 7 Its meaning translates
into "no man shall take advantage of his own wrong. '"108
Sir Edward Coke, in his Commentaries on Littleton, used the

maxim to explain why a tenant could not completely extinguish his
rent because of the waste he committed on the landlord's property.10 9
The waste made the property less valuable and less worthy of rent.
However, the landlord and tenant entered into a contractual relationship voluntarily. To allow the tenant, who knowingly and willingly
committed waste, to be relieved from his contractual obligation would
be poor legal policy. Waste was the tenant's wrong and to allow him to
profit by not paying rent would, in effect, allow him to take advantage
of his own wrong.
The harm contemplated by Coke was committed with knowledge.
The wrong contemplated in the slayer context should also be committed with knowledge. This requires a level of mens rea, or intent, by the
wrongdoer. A tenant committing waste is voluntarily committing a
wrong which, if ignored, would enable him to be relieved from a contractual obligation. The negligent driver is in no way relieving himself
from such an obligation.
It is often said "maxims are dictated by public policy and have
their foundation in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been
superceded by statutes."" 0 If dictated by public policy, the wrong as
developed in the relevant maxim could not possibly mean accident or
103. Quick, 287 N.C. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570.
104. Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570-71.
105. Ford, 512 A.2d at 392.
106. S.S. PELOUBET, A COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS IN LAW AND EQUITY 205 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1985) (1884).
107. See Ford, 512 A.2d at 390; Quick, 287 N.C. at 54, 213 S.E.2d at 568.
108. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
L.2.C.12.SEcT.222. (Vol. 1) (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1832).
109. Id. (This section corresponds to 148(b) of the Commentaries on Littleton).
110. In Re Estate of Tyler, 250 P. 456, 458 (Wash. 1926).
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negligence. The concept of "culpable negligence" upon which North
Carolina courts allow involuntary manslaughter to bar inheritance was
not a common law principle. To allow for such a construction of
"wrong" serves no public policy purpose as it does not effectuate the
intent of the decedent, which is the pole star for the laws of intestacy
and will interpretation. Furthermore, it does not encourage extra care
to avoid a charge of involuntary manslaughter, since it is a rule not
known or assumed by many. It is logical that an intentional killer does
not inherit from the one he killed. However, the North Carolina rule is
overinclusive and only serves to punish the unintentional beneficiary
and the decedent.
D.

Other Common Law and Statutory Interpretation

In 1959, a wife convicted of manslaughter in the fourth degree of
her husband tried to recover as the beneficiary of his life insurance
policies."' In Kansas, fourth degree manslaughter is the equivalent of
the involuntary killing of another in the heat of passion.' 1 2 The defendant insurance company and son contended that since the killing was
felonious by statute, it came within the purview of the Kansas slayer
statute. 11 3 The Kansas slayer statute, unlike that of North Carolina,
prohibited recovery where the person seeking recovery was "convicted
of feloniously killing, or procuring 14the killing of' the person from
whom he or she seeks inheritance.1
A quick read of the slayer statute would prevent the wife from
inheriting, but the court reasoned that this was not the result the legislature intended.1 5 "To adopt the interpretation for which the intervening defendant contends .

.

. would be to prohibit those so convicted

from taking although they had no intention or desire to actually kill or
even harm the insured."' 1 6 The court relied on an illustrative story
demonstrating the injustice of such a holding:
Let us assume that some villain had ravished a neighbor's daughter
and the parents of the daughter deliberately planned to take the life of
the villain, they armed themselves with weapons and went to the place

where the villain was then living, for the deliberate purpose of killing
him, that all of the facts and circumstances were such that if either one
111. Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan.
1959), modified, 182 F. Supp. 633 (D. Kan. 1960).
112. Id. at 385 n.1.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 381.

115. Id. at 382.
116. Id.
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of the parents had killed the villain they would have been guilty of
murder, but the wife, being a poor shot and excited, missed the villain
and killed her husband. Under the law of Michigan, the wife would be
guilty of murder ....
[S]he should not be barred from receiving benefits which she otherwise would receive from life insurance on her husband. The reason she should recover would be because she did not
intend to kill her husband. No cases have been found which hold that
a person is barred from receiving the benefits under a life insurance
policy or under a will, or by inheritance, unless he killed and intended
to kill the person from whom he was to receive benefits. In other
words, as far as the law has ever gone is to prevent the recovery of
benefits which would not have become due and payable except for the
intentional taking of the life of the benefactor." 7
The court could find no case where a court adopted as a test the
classification of a killing as a felony or misdemeanor." 8 The test most
generally adopted is the question of intent to cause death or the feloniousness of the act causing death.' 19 "The 'intent' or 'willfulness' test
would clearly coincide with the intent of the Kansas legislature at the
time it enacted into statutory law what had previously been the common-law rule." 12 0 Thus, since the legislative intent in enacting such a
statute must have been to effect the common-law rule, it is necessary to
interpret "feloniously killing" as including only those convicted of
intentional killing.' 2 ' To construe the statute strictly would mean that
one convicted of only negligent homicide would also be barred, as it is
a felony. 122 The slayer rule instead should only apply to those wrong12 3
doers who intentionally cause the wrong.
The Kansas court, like North Carolina, believed the slayer statute
could not be interpreted too strictly. To interpret it strictly in Kansas
would, according to the Rosenberger court, create a situation not
intended, thus barring negligent killers from inheriting. To interpret
North Carolina's statute strictly would bring about the just result the
Kansas court found. However, North Carolina has construed the
slayer statute broadly to prevent inheritance. In doing so, it has

117. Rosenberger, 176 F. Supp. at 382-83 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Mich. 1941)).
118. Id. at 383.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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reached the opposite 24result of the Kansas court and bars negligent kill1
ers from inheriting.
The third edition of Couch on Insurance1 2 5 provides the rule that
an insurance beneficiary is not barred from receiving the proceeds of
insurance when he or she did not intend to kill the insured. 1 26 This
situation could take place, for example, in an accident, 1 27 or when the
beneficiary fought with the insured and caused his death but not with
the intent to kill,' 28 or when the beneficiary killed the insured in the
commission of an unlawful act, but without having the intent of killing
him or her. 1 29 "The common law rule is frequently redeclared or qualified by statute, by providing that the beneficiary is barred when he or
she 'willfully' or 'intentionally' brings about the death of the
3 0
insured." 1
South Dakota adopted Professor Wade's model in 1937'1' as a
codification of the common law that already provided for the disqualification of willful slayers.' 3 2 The common law as codified is best
explained in DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co of New York,' 3 3 which
stated that the principle of sound public policy demands that a sane,
124. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
125. LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 62:10 (3d ed. 1996).
126. Id. (citing Diep v. Rivas, 727 A.2d 448 (Md. 1999)). This states that where the
killing is unintentional, such as accidental, or grossly negligent amounting to
involuntary manslaughter, the beneficiary's rights under the insurance policy are not
barred by the slayer's rule. See Calaway v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 619
S.W.2d 301 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); Beene v. Gibraltar Indus. Life Ins. Co., 63 N.E.2d
299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1945); Gorley v. Parizek, 475 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1991).
127. Id. (citing Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n. v. Tilley, 3 S.W.2d 320 (Ark.
1928), Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986)).
128. Id. (citing Dowdell v. Bell, 477 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1970); Tippens v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1938)).
129. Id. (citing Throop v. Western Indem. Co., 193 P. 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920)).
130. Id. (citing Huang Tang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 523 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1975);
United Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, 443 F. Supp. 762 (D. Mass. 1978); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Prater, 508 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ky. 1981); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Cawthorne, 48 Cal. App. 3d 651, 121 Cal. Rptr. 808 (2d Dist. 1975); In Re Estate of
Thompson, 426 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Gholson v. Smith, 48 So. 2d 603 (Miss.
1950); Bradley v. Bradley, 573 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Gray, 306 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio 1973); Brooks v. Thompson, 521 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn.
1975)).
131. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 51, 213 S.E.2d 563, 566
(1975). See In Re Estate of Gibbs, 490 N.W.2d 504 (S.D. 1992).
132. Gibbs, 490 N.W.2d at 510.
133. Id. at 510 (citing DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 245 N.W. 58
(S.D.1932)).
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felonious killer should not profit by his crime.134 The statutes of
descent should not operate in favor of such a killer. 135 Implicit in that
court's interpretation of the common law and the statute is the reasoning that a killing as a result of insanity or unintentional killing should
not bar the killer from inheriting.
IV.

INTERPRETATION OF SIMILAR SLAYER STATUTES BY OTHER STATES

Pennsylvania's slayer statute was based on Professor Wade's article and thus reads just like N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A.1 3 6 Idaho also has a
similar statute.1 37 However, the interpretations of these states' statutes
in cases of involuntary manslaughter do not parallel the interpretations of North Carolina courts.
Pennsylvania offers the most convincing evidence since its statute
was adopted around the same time as the North Carolina statute. In
defining how involuntary manslaughter fits in the slayer statute, Pennsylvania has, like North Carolina, agreed that one guilty of involuntary
manslaughter is not a willful and unlawful killer. 138 In Prudential
Insurance Company of America v. Doane, a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter did not bar Mrs. Doane from collecting insurance proceeds. 13 9 However, the court would not allow her to recover until the
plaintiffs brought their civil action to determine whether she was a
slayer under the statute. 4 ° The Doane court found this necessary
because of the varying burdens of proof for civil and criminal trials. 141
Because the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, it
would be entirely possible for the killer to be adjudicated a slayer in a
civil trial and yet not be convicted as a criminal under the reasonable
doubt standard. There was no discussion within Doane as to the common law or actions brought outside the slayer statute.
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again considered
whether one convicted of involuntary manslaughter should be able to
inherit from a decedent.1 42 In determining the meaning of words such
134. Id. at 510 (citing DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 245 N.W. 58
(S.D. 1932)).
135. Id. at 510.
136. Quick, 287 N.C. at 51, 213 S.E.2d at 566.
137. See Idaho Code § 15-2-803 (2001).
138. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Doane, 339 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Penn. 1972);
In re Estate of Klein, 378 A.2d 1182 (Pa. 1977); Quick, 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E. 2d 563
(1975).
139. Doane, 339 F. Supp. 1240.
140. Id. at 1242.
141. Id.

142. Klein, 378 A.2d 1182 (Pa. 1977).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002

17

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 6

312

CAMPBELL LAW REViEW

[Vol. 24:295

as "willful" as used in the Slayer's Act, the court discussed various
meanings such as "intentional," "deliberate and intentional," and "to
suggest 'the presence of intention and at least some power of
choice."'

14 3

The supreme court concluded that "in employing 'willful'

killing in the Slayer's Act, the Legislature intended to designate a
higher degree of culpability than that required for involuntary manslaughter.' 1

44

A different conclusion "would render the word 'willful'

surplusage as 5all unlawful killings would then be covered by the
1' 4
Slayer's Act.'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied on Professor Wade's
commentary to the proposed statute. "Should a statute of this sort
include manslaughter? . . .It is believed it should not if the killing is

involuntary. If the wrong was not intentional, it is difficult to say as a
matter of policy that the perpetrator should be prohibited from acquiring property." 146 Again, the court did not ponder any common law
theories when holding involuntary manslaughter outside the scope of
the statute.
Idaho also has a statute very similar to that of North Carolina. Its
definition for "slayer" is the same, and it also provides a section
allowing for a broad construction of the statute. However, it does not
14 7
specifically permit outside sources where the statute does not fit.
Idaho, by statute, cleared up the difficulty of negligent homicide by
providing specifically in its commentary to the statute: "This section is
confined to intentional and felonious homicide and excludes the acci1
dental manslaughter killing."'

V.

48

THE SOLUTION: NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD ADOPT THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

It is clear from a comparison of the common law and North Carolina court decisions that North Carolina's interpretation of the common law maxim is incorrect. North Carolina's reasoning that the
wrong contemplated by the common law maxim is the equivalent of
involuntary manslaughter is egregious. Clearly, the common law did
143. Id. at 1185 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Hendrick, 312 A.2d 402,
404 (Pa. 1973); Rapoport v. Sirott, 209 A.2d 421, 424 (Pa. 1965); Lucciola v.
Commonwealth, 360 A.2d 310, 311 (Pa. Commw. St. 1976)).
144. Id. at 1185.
145. Id.
146. Klein, 378 A.2d at 1186 (quoting Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully
Killing Another- A Statutory Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 722 (1936)).
147. Idaho Code § 15-2-803 (2001).
148. § 15-2-803.
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not intend such inequitable consequences as those flowing from the
Quick case.
North Carolina has several options to correct the mistake. A court
decision overruling the holding in Quick would solve the problem.
However, that would not be a permanent fix, because such holdings
can be overruled. Later cases relying on Quick would also be affected
but not overruled, creating some confusion in the law. This option
would force the courts to await the outcome of a particular case before
changing the law, and would provide no notice to individuals of the
upcoming change.
Upon considering the inherent problems of waiting for a judicial
decision, a statutory solution is preferable and needed. It is particularly necessary to clarify the issue of the effect of involuntary manslaughter. A statutory change is also required in order to correct the
wording of the statute in § 31A-3(d), which allows for a civil action or
proceeding brought within one year of the death of the decedent to
determine whether the killing or the procurement thereof, was willful
and unlawful.149 To be declared a slayer in a civil action, one must
have died or committed suicide before being tried for the offense or
settlement of the estate. 15 0 Thus, a literal reading of the statute would
not allow for a slayer determination by a civil action unless it was
accompanied by the death of the killer. Clearly the "and" in the statute
should have been an "or," or some similar conjunction. In any case, it
should not read as adopted. The Jones case reflected recognition of
this mistake and attempted to fix the statute to allow for the civil
action.'l5 By changing the interpretation of the statute, the court circumvented the rule that statutes are to be authoritative over case law.
The legislature has several options in solving the dilemma. It
could amend the wording of § 31A-3(d) and then add commentary like
Idaho stating the intention that there should be no forfeiture in the
cases of unintentional killings such as involuntary manslaughter. This
would be an quick and easy solution. The legislature could keep the
slayer statute in its same form and make the necessary modifications
to the provisions including a narrower wording for § 31A-15, which
allows for broad construction of the chapter. Any change here should
clearly indicate that the policy is not to prevent a person from profiting

149. N.C. Gen. Stat. §31A-3(d) (1999). For full text of statute, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
150. N.C. Gen. Stat. §31A-3(d) (1999).
151. Jones v. All American Life Ins. Co, 312 N.C. 725, 325 S.E.2d 237 (1985).
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by his own
wrong, but rather that no slayer shall profit from his own
52
wrong. 1
The best option is for North Carolina to adopt the Uniform Probate Code's Slayer Statute. Colorado and New Mexico have already
adopted this provision. 1 53 Although organized differently than North
Carolina's current statute, the uniform statute covers potential pitfalls.
First, a particularly great strength is the language of the statute defining a slayer as one that "feloniously and intentionally kills." 1 54 This
takes away any doubt as to the meaning of the word "willful." This
provision of the statute also explains all benefits forfeited, including
the different statutory shares, and provides that the decedent's estate
1 55
should be distributed as if the killer disclaimed his or her share.
The Uniform Probate Code provides that a felonious and intentional killing of the decedent will revoke any revocable disposition of
property made by the decedent to the killer. Furthermore, it contains
a provision denying a power of appointment to the killer, and nomina56
tion of the killer to serve in a fiduciary or representative capacity.'
The killing also severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with survivorship rights, thus changing the interests into tenancies in
common. 57 However, such severance will not affect the rights of third
parties who relied on apparent title, unless the appropriate record
showed such evidence to the contrary.' 58 Furthermore, any provisions
in favor of the killer not revoked by this section are given effect as if the
15 9
killer disclaimed all of them.

The Uniform Probate Code provision sets forth procedure for
determining whether the killing was felonious and intentional. This
can be done by a conclusive criminal conviction.' 60 In the absence of
a conviction and by a petition from an interested person, the court
must determine whether the individual would be found criminally
152. Wade, supra note 36, at 751.
153. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-11-803 (2000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-803 (2001).
154. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (amended 1990), 8 Ui.A. 211 (Supp. 2000).
155. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 2000).
This results in the same distribution scheme already in place in North Carolina where
the slayer's intestate share would pass to his or her living issue per stirpes. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 31A-4(2) (1999).
156. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 2000).
157. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 212 (Supp.

2000).

158.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE

§ 2-803(d) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 212 (Supp. 2000).

159.
160.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE

§ 2-803(e) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 212 (Supp. 2000).
§ 2-803(g) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 212 (Supp. 2000).

UNIF. PROBATE CODE
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accountable of such felonious and intentional killing under a prepon16 1
derance of the evidence standard.
The Uniform Probate Code provides a very detailed section for
protection of payors and third parties, 16 2 as well as bona fide purchasers.' 6 3 Perhaps the biggest attraction of the statute is the fact that it
does not open the door to the common law where one has not been
already deemed a "killer." In § 2-803(f), "a wrongful acquisition of
property or interest by a killer not covered in the statute must be
treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from
his [or her] wrong." Since the statute is very thorough, this provision
affords courts appropriate flexibility in interpretation, should an
unimaginable situation arise. The word choice used is quite significant, for, unlike North Carolina or Idaho, the section provides that a
"killer" 1 64 instead of a "person" 165 should not profit from his own
wrong. This indicates that there has already been a felonious and
intentional killing. Furthermore, the comment to the provision specifically states that the act will not preclude inheritance in an accidental
manslaughter but instead applies only to felonious and intentional
killings.

16 6

Lastly, the Uniform Probate Code provision is more modern in
that it encompasses all scenarios from the inception, rather than carving out detailed inclusions and exclusions along the way. The very
title of the statute evidences this: "Effect of Homicide on Intestate Succession, Wills, Trusts, Joint Assets, Life Insurance, and Beneficiary
Designations.' 16 ' North Carolina, in adopting such a statute, will save
itself the many minor revisions that need to be made to its present
statute. Doing so will relieve the pressure on the courts and move the
state towards uniform law on what acts will bar inheritance rights.
Uniformity is clearly desirable in such instances so as to give notice to
citizens, insurance companies, and judges of a standard rule.
Julie Waller Hampton

161.
162.
2000).
163.
164.
165.

Id.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(h) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 212-213 (Supp.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(i) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 213 (Supp. 2000).
UnF.PROBATE CODE § 2-803(0 (amended 1990), 8 UL.A. 212 (Supp. 2000).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-15 (1999); Idaho Code § 15-2-803 (2001).

166. UNIF.
2000).

PROBATE CODE

§ 2-803 (Comment) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 214 (Supp.

167. UNIF.

PROBATE CODE

§2-803 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 2000).
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